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ABSTRACT 
Realistic views are fashionable. In this thesis, I defend a view 
opposed to realism, which Dummett calls "anti-realism". l'!y defence of 
anti-realism depends on the assumption that a theory of meaning should 
explain how speakers understand one another. The theory should 
therefore describe linguistic abilities in terms of communicable 
features of linguistic practice: those which are exhaustively 
manifest in use. I call this the manifestation argument. 
In the first Chapter, I apply the manifestation argument not only 
to theories of meaning which yield specifications of the content of 
sentences of a language (1.2), but also to theories which aim 
primarily to define linguistic behaviour as a species of intentional 
activity (I.3). The manifestation argument tells against the realist 
assumption of verification transcendent truth: that there may be 
truths which speakers could never be in a position to verify (1.2.3, 
I.3.3). However, holistic theories are exempted from the anti-realist 
argument. Alternative characterisations of realism are also mentioned 
(1.4). 
DUmmett's theory of meaning is tailored to ensure that knowledge 
of meaning can be manifested. I endorse this account, with minor 
modifications (II.l-II.S). The revisionary consequences of the 
account are, I think, more extreme than Dummett supposes (II.6). 
Dummett takes Intuitionism in mathematics to be the paradigm of an 
anti-realist account of meaning (III.l-III.2). Two accounts of the 
meaning of the intuitionist logical constants are discussed. The 
first, which Dummett prefers, is in terms of canonical proof 
conditions (III.3-III.4); the second is an intuitionist analogue of a 
Tarski style truth definition (III.5). I argue that the former is 
required for justifying the intuitionist account, even though the 
latter adequately captures the intuitionist notion of truth. 
Chapter IV concerns the motivation of the manifestation argument 
(IV.l). I discuss the acquisition argument for anti-realism used by 
Dummett; namely, that it must be possible to acquire a grasp of the 
meaning of a sentence of a language from experience of its use (IV.2). 
I suggest that the manifestation argument is prior to the acquisition 
argument. I argue that anti-realism need not be reductionist (IV.4), 
and that vagueness suggests a modification of the manifestation 
argument. 
When intuitionism in mathematics provides the model of a theory 
of meaning for natural language, various notions of assertibility 
replace that of provability. Dummett considers conclusive 
verifiability (V.2) and falsifiability (V.3). Both fail to provide an 
acceptable account of negation, and do not allow for those assertions 
of natural language evidence for which is inconclusive (V.4). I take 
conditions of verification and falsification to determine meaning 
(V. 5). 
The intuitionist analogy is applied to time in Chapter VI. I 
discuss the analysis of temporal modification (VI.Z), and argue that 
tensed sentences involve indexical reference to time (VI.3). This 
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suggests a generalised anti-realism about spatial and personal 
indexicals, which I reject (VI.4). I also reject Dummett's treatment 
of tense-links, but endorse a modified anti-realism about time (VI.5). 
I conclude with a discussion of holism. According to Dummett, 
holistic theories are objectionable because they are not molecular 
(VII.l). There are three strands in Dummett's notion of molecularity, 
and I discuss the role of each in rejecting varieties of holism 
(VII.2-VII.4). Dummett has doubts about anti-realist molecular 
theories which I dismiss, but I argue that the anti-realist cannot 
explain what I call 'radical' meaning change (VII.5). 
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NOTE 
Each chapter, which is labelled with a Roman numeral, is divided 
into section and subsections, labelled with Arabic numerals. I refer 
to sections of the essay using those numerals: thus I.1.1 refers to 
chapter I, section l, subsection 1. When I refer to a section within 
a chapter, I omit the Roman numeral for that chapter: thus 1.1 in 
Chapter I refers to I.l.1. 
I have adopted Dummett's (1977) use of&, v, ~, 1, V, and 3 for 
the intuitionist logical constants. Classical constants are ., V, ~. 
~, () and E. When I wish to allow both classical and intuitionist 
readings of the logical constants, I employ the intuitionist 
constants. I do so at III.3 and III.S. In Chapter V, I use the 
intuitionist constants for a variety of readings of the falsification 
calculus, and for a non-intuitionist negation. I do not think that 
the ambiguity causes confusion. 
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INTRODUCTION 
It is not difficult to understand sentences in a language one 
knows. It is harder to explain in what understanding consists. One 
way of doing so is to describe what a speaker must know in order to 
understand sentences of a language. Theories of speakers' semantic 
knowledge have assumed that speakers know what would make sentences of 
a language true, or that speakers know what would justify the 
assertion of sentences of a language. 
According to Dummett, the first of these alternatives is a 
characteristically realist account of meaning. He uses the 
"colourless term" (1978, p.l45) anti-realism for the second. Dummett 
defends anti-realism on the grounds that an adequate account of 
speakers' abilities to understand one another must ensure that 
understanding is exhaustively manifest in their linguistic behaviour: 
a form of argument which I call 'the manifestation argument'. A 
realist supposes that sentences might be true although their assertion 
could not in principle be justified. In that case, Dummett argues, 
speakers could not manifest their understanding of those sentences. 
Dummett draws the startling consequence that we must not only 
reject realism, but that we must also revise our classical logical 
practices. We cannot assume that every sentence is either true or 
false, for we might never be in a position either to justify the 
assertion of a sentence or show that it is false. Moreover, if we 
accept that a sentence is false just if its negation is true, we can 
no longer assume that either a sentence or its negation is true. 
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In this thesis, my aim is to examine the manifestation argument 
and its consequences. I shall defend anti-realism. Anti-realism must 
be distinguished from other theories which are opposed to realism. It 
differs from traditional idealism in so far as it is based on 
semantic, not epistemological, premisses. The anti-realist rejects 
the claim that there are truths which could not in principle be 
justified. Nevertheless, those truths which can in principle be 
justified are truths about the objective world. There should be no 
inclination to treat publicclly assessable truths as any less true of 
the world than the traditional realist would suppose. 
Anti-realism is not intended to be a species of relativism. The 
anti-realist may admit that the tr.uths a speaker can express are 
limited to those which could be justified in a language which he 
understands. But reality is not determined by the truths which a 
particular speaker, or group of speakers, can justify. The 
limitations on truth which the anti-realist sets are determined by the 
abilities of speakers of any language to justify their assertions. 
For example, the anti-realist rejects realism about the past because 
it is impossible to move at will into the past in order to justify 
past tensed assertions. Again, the anti-realist rejects a platonist 
interpretation of infinite totalities because we cannot scan an 
infinite totality in a finite time and justify assertions about it. 
Truth is relativised only to human limitations on assessing truth 
value, not to a particular language or society. 
Logical positivism is more closely related to anti-realism than 
either idealism or relativism. Logical positivists, like the 
anti-realist, insist that it must be possible to verify or falsify 
meaningful assertions. However, the anti-realist differs from logical 
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positivists in allowing that a sentence may be meaningful, although 
there is no way guaranteed to verify or falsify it. A past tensed 
statement may not now be verifiable or falsifiable, but a verification 
or falsification might arise. In that case, the anti-realist regards 
the sentence as meaningful, but neither true nor false. The 
anti-realist does not require a reduction of meaningful sentences to 
those the truth value of which is guaranteed to be decidable. 
Dummett first defended anti-realism of this type. Accordingly, a 
large part of this essay concerns the details of his views. In what 
follows, I shall indicate briefly how they relate to my own attitudes. 
Dummett employs the manifestation argument to reject realist accounts 
of the content of sentences of a language. In the first chapter, I 
suggest that the manifestation argument also applies to conventional 
and intentional theories of meaning. In that chapter, I also 
characterise theories of meaning according to whether they aim to 
provide a conceptual analysis of 'meaning' or to yield specifications 
of the content of sentences of a particular language. 
This distinction enables me to discuss what is, I think, one of 
the most confusing aspects of Dummett's work. He argues that 
assertion, conceived of as a conventional activity, provides the 
evidence for a theory of meaning. I shall suggest that Dummett takes 
the conventions of linguistic behaviour to describe the concept of 
meaning, since those conventions are common to speakers of all 
languages. The assertibility conditions of sentences of a particular 
language determine their content. Although I disagree with Dummett on 
many of the details of an account of assertibility conditions, I think 
that his approach is essentially correct. The most crucial respect in 
which I differ from Dummett is that I think that truth is defined by 
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conditions under which assertions of any kind, including ethical and 
vague assertions, are correct. I argue that the notion of truth so 
defined must be used in the explanation of the assertibility 
conditions of complex sentences. Assertibility must, then, distribute 
over the logical constants. Dummett sometimes contests this claim. 
My discussion of Dummett's extensive WLitings on Intuitionism is 
superficial, and is designed to emphasise those aspects of 
intuitionist logic which Dummett adopts for a theory of meaning for 
natural language. Dummett's rationale for intuitionism is that it 
ensures that knowledge of the meaning of sentences involving 
quantification over infinite domains is manifestable. Undecidability 
in mathematics arises solely from such quantification. In this 
regard, natural language differs from mathematics since atomic 
sentences of natural language may be undecidable. 
Dummett draws analogies between a natural deduction system for 
intuitionist logic, and requirements on an account of the meani~g of 
logically complex sentences in natural language. I agree with Dummett 
that canonical proof conditions for complex sentences, having 
properties analogous to introduction laws for constants in a natural 
deduction system, give the meaning of the intuitionist logical 
constants. However, I think, unlike Dummett, that the disquotational 
specifications given by an intuitionist analogue of a Tarski style 
theory do so too, although I agree with Dummett that the 
disquotational theory cannot justify intuitionist logic. I am chary 
of accepting a further analogy with natural deduction systems which 
Dummett proposes. He suggests that we can treat the grounds and 
consequences of sentences of natural language as resembling the 
introduction and elimination laws for logical constants, and as 
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independently specifiable in much the same way. 
Dummett generally presents the argument for anti-realism in terms 
of speakers' knowledge of meaning. This is how I have formulated the 
argument at the beginning of this introduction. But I shall argue in 
Chapter IV that this is a misleading way to express the manifestation 
argument. The manifestation argument is essentially an argument that 
semantic knowledge can be attributed to speakers only if it is 
manifested in their behaviour. It is not primarily an argument about 
knowledge of meaning. Furthermore, I think Dummett's claim th&t there 
is an alternative route to anti-realism based on considerations about 
how linguistic abilities are acquired is mistaken. 
refutations of anti-realism which concentrate on the 
I reject 
reductive 
character of anti-realism, and those which point to extension by 
analogy as a justification of our realistic practices. 
In the fifth chapter, I discuss the application of the 
intuitionist analogy to natural language. I argue that there are 
insuperable difficulties with an intuitionist style negation in 
natural language. Dummett suggests an alternative falsificationist 
account of meaning for sentences of natural language, but the account 
of deducibility he adopts is unsatisfactory. I also reject 
probabilistic semantics for sentences of natural language, although 
the observation which motivates such semantics that there are many 
sentences of natural language which can never be conclusively verified 
or falsified is correct. I take conditions of verification and 
falsification to determine the meaning of sentences of natural 
language. Dummett rejects this account, but I think that his reasons 
are unconvincing. The account remedies the defects of an intuitionist 
style negation, and suggests how we might deal with assertions 
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evidence for which is essentially inconclusive. 
Dummett takes the unusual view that the past may not be real 
while the present and finitely distant future are. He also claims 
that the content or meaning of sentences of a language must be 
relativised to a time. I argue that these two views are inconsistent. 
In Chapter VI, I endorse Dummett's anti-realism about the past, but 
reject the relativisation of meaning to time. In doing so, I adopt an 
analysis of tensed sentences which treats tense in terms of indexical 
reference to times. Dummett prefers to treat tensed sentences as 
involving temporal operators. His arguments for this analysis are not 
compelling. 
Finally, I turn to Dummett's remarks about holism. These are 
again rather confusing. I attempt to disentangle the elements of his 
notion of molecularity. Molecularity is a property which Dummett 
thinks is desirable in a theory of meaning, and which holistic 
theories lack. A molecular theory has at least the three following 
properties: it yields determinate meanings for every sentence of a 
language, it yields publicly manifestable meanings for every sentence 
of the language and the meaning of every sentence can be expressed in 
terms of sentences no more complex than itself. By identifying these 
properties, I am able to determine which feature of molecularity 
various types of holism reject, and to employ arguments separately 
against them. 
I think that Dummett's concern that an anti-realist molecular 
theory cannot explain the informativeness and necessity of deductive 
argument is baseless. But there are worse difficulties for 
anti-realism than Dummett recognises in accounting for the related 
phenomenon of the informativeness of technological change. Certain 
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technological changes so alter the procedures of determining truth 
value in a language that the anti-realist must treat them as changing 
the meaning of sentences in the language. This means that the 
anti-realist cannot explain such changes. Moreover, the anti-realist 
must admit, in this case, that truth is relativised to the means of 
determining truth value at a stage of scientific enquiry~ So, despite 
my earlier remarks, anti-realism appears to be a species of 
relativism. I do not think that this is a bad thing, but it is 
certainly not a feature of anti-reaJism as Dummett advocates it. 
I make no apology for concentrating as I have on Dummett's 
presentation of anti-realism. I am convinced that the manifestation 
argument is correct, and that it provides strong reasons for doubting 
our realist conceptions of the world. I would apologise for the 
tentative nature of my conclusions, were it not that I believe that 
tentative conclusions are the best that can be drawn. 
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